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upon the children and the community.2 0 Subsequent to this final
word by the Supreme Court, it has been held that "released time" is
constitutional unless characterized by elements rendering it otherwise,
that its constitutionality must be tested by its particular factual
aspects, that absences for such purposes are to be handled in the
same manner as requests for absence on holy days or for any other
legitimate cause, and that such a program can only be condemned
on a finding that it is in aid of religion.21
As a general rule, therefore, the constitutionality of "released
time" depends upon the facts of each particular program. A com-
parison of the facts of the McCollum case and the principal case
shows the basis of each holding. In the former case there was (1)
no underlying enabling state statute, (2) religious training took
place in the public school building, (3) school officials supervised
the religious teacher, (4) pupils were segregated in school according
to religion, and (5) pupils were solicited in school for the instruc-
tions; whereas in the instant case, (1) there is an enabling statute,
(2) instruction takes place off the school premises on private prop-
erty, (3) the particular denomination selects its own religious in-
structor and curriculum, (4) there is no segregation according to
religion (those wishing instruction are merely dismissed one hour
earlier one day each week), and (5) there is no solicitation of pupils
(parents sign a request, furnished by the religious group, that the
child be dismissed, which request is presented to the school author-
ities at the beginning of the semester).
The "released time" program in New York City, being free
from objectionable aspects, is therefore not a violation of the First
Amendment. This decision is in accord with the view of the ma-
jority of the state courts, the law as laid down by the United States
Supreme Court, and is a restatement of the general rule that "re-
leased time" programs are not per se unconstitutional.
EVIDENCE - JUDGMENTS - ADMISSIBILITY AND EFFECT OF A
CRIMINAL CONVICTION IN A SUBSEQUENT CIVIL ACTION.- In an
action for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident,
plaintiff's counsel inquired of the defendant operator whether he had
been convicted of "dangerous driving" 1 in connection with circum-
have in the execution .. . that close judicial scrutiny is demanded.. . ." Id. at
225.
20 See note 15 mspra.21 Lewis v. Spaulding, 193 Misc. 66, 85 N. Y. S. 2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
1 The traffic regulations define "dangerous driving" as "driving, using or
operating any vehicle or appliance or accessory thereof (1) in a manner which
unreasonably interferes with the free and proper use of a private or public
street or a footwalk thereof, (2) or unreasonably endangers the users thereof,
[ VOL.. 25
RECENT DECISIONS
stances relative to the accident. The trial court allowed the question
over the objection and exception of defense counsel, and the witness
was obliged to admit such a conviction. On appeal, plaintiff con-
tended that even if it should be decided that the defendant had been
deprived of his right of privilege as a witness under Section 355 of
the New York Civil Practice Act,2 still, no reversible error had been
committed. It was argued that plaintiff had the right to establish
the fact of appellant's prior conviction by introducing the certificate
of such conviction into evidence at the trial. Hence, it was reasoned,
no right of the defendant had been prejudiced by requiring him to
testify to the fact of his prior conviction. Held, a record of convic-
tion for a traffic infraction after trial on a not guilty plea is in-
admissible against a defendant in a civil suit arising out of the same
occurrence, nor is he subject to interrogation in respect to such con-
viction to establish a charge of negligence. Walther v. News Syndi-
cate Co., 276 App. Div. 169, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 537 (1st Dep't 1949).
"The question of admissibility in a civil case and weight to be
accorded a judgment of conviction in criminal or quasi-criminal 3
proceedings has been frequently before the courts." 4 Generally, it
has been held that such judgments are not admissible in subsequent
civil suits as evidence of the facts upon which they were rendered.5
This has always been the rule in England 6 and in the majority of
American states.7 However, ancient and established as the rule may
(3) or the driver himself, (4) or any occupant of the vehicle he operates,
(5) or property." NEW YORK, CIr POLICE DEPARTMIENT TrAMC REGULATIONS
Art. 3, § 20. Although the definition is textually similar to that of the mis-
demeanor of "reckless driving," N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIc LAW § 58,
"dangerous driving" is not a crime. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 2.
2 N. Y. Civ. Pmac. Act § 355. "A competent witness shall not be excused
from answering a relevant question, on the ground only that the answer may
tend to establish the fact that he owes a debt or is otherwise subject to a
civil suit. This provision does not require a witness to give an answer which
will tend to accuse himself of a crime or to expose him to a penalty or for-
feiture; nor does it vary any other rule respecting the examination of a
witness, nor shall any zeitiess be required to disclose a conviction for a traffic
infraction, as defined by the vehicle and traffic law, nor shall conviction therefor
affect the credibility of such witness in, any action or proceeding." (Italics
supplied.)
3 The term quasi-criminal embraces all offenses, which are neither crimes
nor misdemeanors. See 2 PoPE, LEGAL DERInxoxs 1328.
4 Walther v. News Syndicate Co., 276 App. Div. 169, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 537,
542 (lst Dep't 1949).
S Chantangco v. Abaroa, 218 U. S. 476 (1910); Stone v. United States,
167 U. S. 178 (1897); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Murdaugh, 94 F. 2d 104(4th Cir. 1938); Washington National Insurance Co. v. Clement, 192 Ark.
371, 91 S. W. 2d 265 (1936); Krowka v. Colt Patent Fire Arm Mfg. Co., 125
Conn. 705, 8 A. 2d 5 (1939) ; Hampton v. Westover, 137 Neb. 695, 291 N. W.
93 (1940).
e Hollington v. F. Hewthorn & Co., [1943] K. B. 27; Jones v. White,
1 Strange 68, 93 Eng. Rep. 389 (K. B. 1717); The King v. The Warden of
the Fleet, 12 Mod. 338, 88 Eng. Rep. 1363 (K. B. 1699).
7 Helms v. State, 4 Div. 98, 45 So. 2d 170, cert. denied, 4 Div. 603, 45 So.
1950l
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be, it has not gone without criticism,8 alteration,9 and dissent.' 0
Indeed, even in those jurisdictions where courts emphatically declare
allegiance to the exclusion rule, exceptions have often penetrated its
armor of precedent."
Most piercing of the criticisms advanced by the assailants of the
exclusion doctrine is that a refusal to admit evidence of an antecedent
conviction in subsequent civil proceedings is to deny to the record
verdict of a competent court its just and rightful dignity.12 This,
it is charged, begets injustice and fosters criticism and distrust for
our judicial system.'3 Further, they insist that one against whom a
verdict has been rendered in a court, and under circumstances where
his every right has been zealously preserved, should be estopped to
deny to that verdict its full effect. 14 That these arguments have had
their effect on judicial thinking is evident in the growing number of
those who are renouncing the exclusion rule to seek a less stringent
doctrine. 15
On the other hand, the advocates of strict exclusion have shown
equal vigor in their defense of the established rule.1 6 They argue
that to admit evidence of a prior conviction in ancillary civil litiga-
tion is to deny to the defendant mutuality of estoppel (1) by reason
of the fact that a plaintiff, who was not a party to the prior proceed-
ings cannot be bound by the determinations made in them,1 7 and
2d 171 (Ala. 1950); Stevens v. Duke, 42 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1949) ; Wilkes v.
Dinsman, 7 How. 89 (U. S. 1849). See note 5 supra. Accord, United States
v. One 1942 Plymouth Sedan Auto, 89 F. Supp. 884 (E. D. Tenn. 1950) ; Smith
v. White, 216 S. W. 2d 672 (Texas 1948).
8 "Logic compels a relaxation of the long followed earlier rule of complete
exclusion." North River Ins. Co. v. Militello, 100 Colo. 343, 67 P. 2d 625,
626 (1937). (Italics supplied.)9 See Bealor v. Hahn, 132 Pa. 242, 19 Atl. 74 (1890) (conviction of a
husband on a charge of deserting his wife held "persuasive" evidence of the
fact of desertion in subsequent civil litigation).
10 See note 24 infra.
11 The principal exceptions to the non-admissibility rule are made (1) in
those cases where it becomes material to prove the existence of such judg-
ment in the criminal case, as where the ancillary civil suit is for malicious
prosecution, and (2) in actions to recover penalties where the same are con-
ditioned on the conviction of the defendant. See Interstate Dry Goods Stores
v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S. E. 301, 302 (1922).
12 See Sovereign Camp W.O.W. v. Gunn, 227 Ala. 400, 150 So. 491, 492
(1933).
13 See Schindler v. Royal Insurance Co., 258 N. Y. 310, 313, 179 N. E. 711,
712 (1932).
14 80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 1164 (1932).
15 New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co. of New York
City, 117 F. 2d 404, 411 (1941). "The older cases generally excluded such
evidence (prior convictions); now however, there is an apparently increasing
number of cases holding to the contrary." See Note, 50 YALE L. J. 499 (1940).
16 For arguments against admissibility, see Hinton, Judgment of Convic-
tion; Effect on a Civil Case, 27 ILL. L. REV. 195 (1932). For a reprint and
criticism of Professor Hinton's views, see 5 WIGMOlE, EVIDENCE § 16 71a (3d
ed. 1940).
17 In Silva v. Silva, 297 Mass. 217, 7 N. E. 2d 601 (1937), a proceeding
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(2) because a verdict of acquittal would not, in most instances, be
competent proof in defendant's favor.' s  The latter of these conten-
tions seems without merit. 9 More persuasive are some of the other
rationales urged in defense of the doctrine. These are that as be-
tween criminal proceedings and their ancillary civil actions, there are
dissimilarities of persons,20 objects,21 and procedure.2 2  The fre-
quency with which courts reiterate these latter arguments as bases
for their adherence to the exclusion rule is indicative of their merit.23
Indeed, only one American court has chosen to utterly reject this
reasoning and overthrow completely the doctrine of inadmissibility.24
Instead, there has developed a minority rule, which although it
rejects the tenets of strict exclusion, does not yet confer upon the
antecedent criminal verdict the dignity of res judicata. Under this
minority doctrine, the prior conviction is given weight as prima facie
evidence, 25 while in conformity with the established rule, verdicts of
acquittal are denied admissibility.26 Such is 2 and has been the rule
in New York from an early time.28-  However, in those cases where
the antecedent conviction has been for the violation of an ordinance
or traffic regulation, even those courts, which are committed to the
minority view, have continued to apply the rule of strict exclusion. 29
Here, the courts, recognizing the weakness of such verdicts as proof
of the facts which they purport to determine,3 0 have been reluctant
contesting a divorce decree, evidence as to the conviction of the husband for
non-support was held inadmissible even though the conviction was for failure
to support the wife within the period of alleged desertion for which the divorce
decree was granted. The court pointed to the lack of mutuality in that nothing
decided in the criminal proceedings could have bound the wife, who was not a
party to them.
18 Powell v. Wiley, 125 Ga. 823, 54 S. E. 732 (1906); Chernes v. Rosen-
wasser, 181 App. Div. 837, 169 N. Y. Supp. 38 (2d Dep't 1918). But cf.
United States v. Salem, 244 Fed. 296 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).9C ,,. a judgment of acquittal is only a determination that guilt has not
been established beyond a reasonable doubt, although a preponderance of evi-
dence might point thereto." Schindler v. Royal Insurance Co., 258 N. Y. 310,
313, 179 N. E. 711, 712 (1932).2 0 Kusnir v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 201 Fed. 146 (S. D. N. Y. 1912);
Myers v. Maryland Casualty Co., 123 Mo. App. 682, 101 S. W. 124 (1907).
21 See Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S. E.
301, 302 (1922).
22 Jay v. State, 15 Ala. App. 255, 73 So. 137, 138, cert. denied, 198 Ala.
691, 73 So. 1000 (1916).
23 See note 5 supra.2 4 Eagle Star & British Dominion Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140- S. E.
314 (1927). Accord, Poston v. Home Ins. Co., 191 S. C. 314, 4 S. E. 2d 261
(1939).
2S Wolff v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 282 Ky. 824, 140 S. W. 2d 640 (1940).
26 See note 18 supra.
27 Giessler v. Accurate Brass, Inc., 271 App. Div. 980, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 1
(2d Dep't 1947).
28 Maybee v. Avery, 18 Johns. 532 (N. Y. 1820).
29 See Zenuk v. Johnson, 114 Conn. 383, 158 AUt. 910 (1932) ; cf. Page v.
Phelps, 108 Conn. 572, 143 At. 890 (1928).
30 80 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 1164 (1932).
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to alter the established doctrine.3' Writers in legal periodicals have
shared this view.8 2
The decision in the instant case squarely aligns New York
courts with this latter view; and although it cannot be said that New
York precedent clearly supports the ruling,3 3 Justice Callahan has
found ample justification for his expressed conclusion. It is his con-
tention, adopted from the case of Hart v. Mealy,3" 4 that in its enact-
ment of Section 355 of the New York Civil Practice Act 35 the state
legislature ". . . recognized the weakness of evidence of a traffic in-
fraction as proof of the facts which may have been involved." 36
Further, he asserts that ". . . the rule of public policy thus declared
seems to go beyond the mere question of privilege or credibility of a
witness." 7  Inasmuch as receipt of the certificate of conviction is
tantamount to obliging a witness to testify to the prior verdict against
him, the logic and force of the conclusion reached in the instant case
is compelling.3 8
EVIDENCE-WHEN NEGATIVE TESTIMONY RAISES AN ISSUE FOR
THE JuRY.-Plaintiff's intestate was killed in a collision with a train
owned and operated by defendant. Decedent stopped her car at a
crossing, allowed an eastbound train to pass, and then proceeded.
The car was struck by a westbound train. The crew on the west-
31 General Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Sherby, 165 Md. 1, 165 At. 809 (1933).
32 Note, 50 YALE L. J. 499.
33 In an action arising out of an intersection collision, judgment of convic-
tion of the defendant for violation of an ordinance in exceeding speed limit
at the time of the accident was held admissible as prima facie evidence of the
facts involved. Same v. Davison, 253 App. Div. 123, 1 N. Y. S. 2d 374 (4th
Dep't 1937). But see Merkling v. Ford Auto, 251 App. Div. 89, 96, 296 N. Y.
Supp. 393, 401 (4th Dep't 1937).
34287 N. Y. 39, 38 N. E. 2d 123 (1941).
35 See note 2 supra.
36 Walther v. News Syndicate Co., 276 App. Div. 169, 174, 93 N. Y. S. 2d
537, 543.
37 Ibid.
38 N. Y. VanicLE & TRAFFIc LAW § 70, subd. 11, provides: "Upon the
conviction of any person . . . of a violation of any of the provisions of this
chapter or of any lawful ordinance, except a parking ordinance, made by local
authorities in relation to traffic . . . the trial court or the clerk thereof shall
within forty-eight hours certify the facts of the case to the commissioner,
who shall record the same in his office. Such certificate shall be presumptive
evidence of the facts therein." (Italics supplied.) It has been urged
(14 BROOKLYN L. Rxv. 246) that this provision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law
precludes the court from ruling as it has in the instant case. However, the
single provisions of a given statute must be read in their relation to the whole
of the statute. [Merkling v. Ford Auto, 251 App. Div. 89, 94, 296 N. Y. Supp.
393, 399 (4th Dep't 1937).] So read, the above provision of Section 70 would
seem to be applicable only in those cases where the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles is proceeding to revoke the operating license of an offending driver.
[ VOL. 25
